6. Recap: Rough Road Ahead
GENERAL SANTOS CITY (MindaNews/18 May) – Both Government and MILF have hailed the “Decision” as a breakthrough; so have the peace advocates – the first upbeat; the second, remaining focused on their original demand. But that is just half the story. They are all aware that in the 15-year Government-MILF peace negotiation breakdowns have followed breakthroughs. Just to refresh the memory:
The August1998 General Framework of Agreement of Intent was also hailed as a breakthrough. In April 2000, the all-out war dealt not only the breakdown but also the breakup that drove the MILF into all-out guerrilla war.
The June 2001 Tripoli Agreement on Peace was another breakthrough. This was broken by the February 2003 Pikit war.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in her July 28, 2008 State of the Nation Address, exulted in the initialing of the MOA-AD toward midnight before that as a historic breakthrough. A week after on August 4, the Supreme Court giving due course to petitions of angry political leaders restrained the signing of the MOA-AD and two months and a half later on October 14 declared it unconstitutional to trigger a year-long atrocious breakdown.
The very trying task of Government and MILF now is to avoid a breakdown on the rough road ahead when they resume the peace talks this month. Both are aware of this.
Two-Part Formula
The “Decision” itself says it is a two-part formula in the pursuit of a peace agreement. The ten key points so agreed and signed last April 24 is the first part; the key points not included among the ten yet “not preclude[d] from future agreements” are the other part. This implies that the final agreement on the “Decision” may not be the final solution to the Bangsamoro problem.
Why were all key points not included in the “Decision”? This is a formula for a breakthrough that can end in a breakdown.
President Aquino III formed the GPH panel in July 2010. From that time until February 2011 when MILF submitted its Revised Comprehensive Compact (MCDA 2011), the government panel must have formulated its policies, guidelines and talking points. After February 2011, the Parties held two informal talks for the government panel to clarify some points in the MILF draft.
The government peace team – the panel, OPAPP and other presidential advisers – must have found the MCDA 2011 to be a dilemma. While many of its key provisions are not in accord with the government policies, rejecting them will worsen the Mindanao problem. The President wants the Moro problem solved during his term.
Why not use MCDA 2011 to resolve the dilemma? The GPH panel adopted provisions of MCDA 2011 in whole or in parts that were in accord with government policies — setting aside without rejecting those that are not. Merged with the GPH panel’s talking points they became part of the “GPH ‘3 for 1’ Formula”. GPH panel member Miriam Coronel-Ferrer said “most of the demands of the MILF for self-governance can be accommodated within the present Constitution” and “incorporated” in the new ARMM Organic Act.
Consequently, there are evident “commonalities” between MCDA 2011 and the GPH “3 for 1” Formula. However, there are big “differences” that together with the key points set aside yet open for future agreements would make the road ahead rough and rugged.
“Decision” Evolved
How did the “Decision” come about?
Leonen, in his post-signing statements, wanted it seen in the “Decision” that Government and MILF have made great efforts to identify the mutually agreeable substantive points to fast tract the negotiation. The document has made “public the direction and substance of the peace negotiations”.
In his opening statement, he recalled “that the panels decided to look at what may be common between our proposals … that we agreed to focus, in the meantime, at this table on political restructuring. We also know that we have identified at least eleven points where we might have an agreement and found language for at least ten points. Our panels, and our principals, know that these are only an initial set of agreements which must be contextualized later by the full final agreement.”
Then he addressed the MILF: “But, upon the suggestion of your panel, we have agreed to craft it in a signable document to mark our agreement and progress.” Understanding him as saying that the “Decision” came to be at the initiative, if not insistence, of MILF, we asked Iqbal and MILF panel member Michael O. Mastura to comment.
Iqbal explained: “In a sense, we pressed for the 11 Decision Points because we have been navigating the peace table for two years without any concrete achievement. We were the first to suggest to enumerate common points not for signing but part of the consensus of the parties.” [The need to sign came later.]
He continued: “The common points came from our series of discussions. I think that was in December. In February, the text was agreed and by March, we were supposed to sign it.” [For reasons already mentioned, the signing did not go through.]
He explained: “The status quo provision came from our stand that the status quo which is the unitary system … so one-sided against the Moros is ‘unacceptable’. Leonen also made this claim in one of his speeches, although his reference is more on the ARMM and the ‘legacy’ of the Arroyo administration.”
Mastura revealed: “It was ICG-initiated commonalities but with the Facilitator’s desire to put back on track the negotiation or at least for coming to terms with closure.” [So, the Facilitator desired; the International Contact Group initiated; MILF pressed; GPH agreed.]
“The phrase ‘decisions on principle’ was at my instance to signal particular conviction of the merits of devolution. The MILF has never departed from the ‘substate’ approach.” [Emphasis supplied]
To him the “differences” are significant: “Backed by serious study/research on this conceptual formulation, it is not the ‘commonalities’ but the ‘differences’ which are remarkable fundamentally to determine the shape of devolution. Transfer of power (real empowerment or entrenchment) through a minimalist conception or devolution that is not contrary to constitutional practice would provide a ‘new formula’ that is “free from imposition’.” [Emphasis supplied]
The “Decision” bears the common desire of all principals concerned to move the peace negotiation to its successful end. In their Joint Statement, GPH and MILF declared: “The two Parties signed the GPH-MILF Decision Points on Principles as of April 2012. This document shall guide the discussions on the substantive agenda of the negotiations.” Yet, it has not leveled the rough road ahead.
Worrisome Points
Clashing points are still worrisome.
First: The Parties interpret differently the terms “unacceptable status quo” and “new autonomous political entity” (Key Point 2). They are bound to clash in issues concerning “transition” (Key Point 5) and “power-sharing” and “wealth-sharing” (Key Point 6). Other key points, particularly 1, 3 and 4, are not clash-free. These are essentially vital points; MILF has consistently held on to its positions spelled out in MCDA 2011.
By “unacceptable status quo”, MILF is referring to the unjust subjection of the Moros under the unitary Philippine government dating back to the Commonwealth regime under President Manuel L. Quezon in1935. The Aquino Government is referring to conditions in the ARMM. There’s “heaven and earth” difference in that.
The creation of a “new autonomous political entity” is the solution. To MILF this means the creation of a full autonomy under the full Bangsamoro control. To GPH this means the reform of ARMM under a tri-party partnership composed of Government, MILF and the Moro leaders in the present ARMM. To MILF this is unacceptable.
MILF has spelled out in concrete the full autonomy it has proposed – the asymmetrical state-substate relation with the national government – in MCDA 2011. Leonen, in his opening statement, propounded the four principles of autonomy and the fact about unitary form of government in relation to autonomy. This is a suggestion to MILF to reconsider its position according to the four principles.
“First, … autonomy seems to be to allow for more democratic spaces in situations where a ‘national minority’ … because of its sheer numerical minority would have a difficult time in national policy.
“Second, autonomous relationships are per se asymmetrical. That is, that they enjoy competencies which may not be similar to the other levels of local governments. Again, the justification here is that it has distinctive historical, social and cultural characteristics that bind its inhabitants.
“Third, autonomous relationships go through phases and are continually negotiated [for various compelling reasons].
“Fourth, autonomous areas are rarely self contained; that is, the problems it encounters can also affect not only its neighboring regions but also the national state as well.”
Our task: “… [We] are precisely discussing the contours of that autonomous area, the modalities of governance specifically the relationship of that autonomous political entity to the national government and the transition period to lead to that meaningful autonomous reality.”
The fact: “The mere fact that we have an autonomous relationship clearly negates that the Republic of the Philippines, in its ideal, is purely a unitary form of government.”
The differing views of GHP and MILF concerning “unacceptable status quo” and “new autonomous political entity” will radically impact on transition arrangement, wealth-sharing and power-sharing – the critical factors in the full autonomy that MILF wants. In particular, MILF wants to lead in providing direction to NAPE. But MILF is wary of the “3-3-3 transition scheme” under the Bangsamoro Commission as proposed in the “3 for 1 Proposal” [See: Briefing Paper: The GPH ”3-for-1” Proposal] since this would put the new autonomy under continuous control of the national government.
Second: The Parties have different mandates and negotiation positions. These may be stated briefly:
– MILF: To negotiate an agreement to correct the century-old injustices to the Moros. In the MCDA 2011, MILF has consistently adhered to the original agreed talking point — “How to solve the Bangsamoro Problem” — and exposed all its cards on the table even if it had abandoned its bid for independence.
– GPH: To negotiate an agreement acceptable to all and doable under existing political and legal realities prevailing within the six-year term of the Aquino III administration ending on June 30, 2016. In articulating Government’s position, Leonen has kept his cards in his sleeves.
The past GRP-MILF negotiations were on the MILF proposition; the Parties’ mandates converged on this proposition. The present GPH-MILF negotiations are on two different propositions following their divergent mandates; in the “Decision”, the Parties intend to unite their widely divergent propositions.
By Leonen’s own words, the GPH “3 for 1” Proposal is a tentative proposal; it is just a “minimum” draft that can be changed in its entirety (MindaNews, September 3, 2011). In contrast, MCDA 2011 is the second or third revision of the MOA-AD, yet MILF has not wavered from its right to self-determination except the abandonment of independence.
Third: The key points not included among the ten of the “Decision” as of April 2012 will turn out worrisome. Can GHP persuade MILF to slide down much more farther down their position after dropping its bid for independence and abandon entirely all those key points?
Inference
With the rough, rugged road ahead, does it mean there may be no agreement at all? No! We believe the Parties must make sacrifices — level the road — to have one. Either they push or pull the peace cart together or one pulls and the other pushes.
More than to the Bangsamoros and the people of Mindanao, signing a final agreement is their joint international commitment – to the Malaysian government that has hosted and facilitated the talks since 2001; to the International Monitoring Group that has helped keep the peace; to the donor countries and agencies helping develop Moro communities; and to the governments and agencies whose representatives compose the International Contact Group.
What will they gain by stubbornly standing by their respective ends of the peace cart, each Party pulling the peace cart in its direction of the road?
There is only one proposition: restoring lost justice to the Moros. MILF must not demand more than what is proper to restore that justice; GPH and the national majority must not dilute the proposition and the issues with their biases, prejudices and vested interests. Together, they can level the rough, rugged road and pull or push the peace cart to the direction of that justice. (“Comment” is Mr. Patricio P. Diaz’ column for MindaViews, the opinion section of MindaNews. The Titus Brandsma Media Awards honored Mr. Diaz with a “Lifetime Achievement Award” for his “commitment to education and public information to Mindanawons as Journalist, Educator and Peace Advocate.” You can reach him at patpdiazgsc@yahoo.com.)