4th of a series: What More They Say II
GENERAL SANTOS CITY (MindaNews/12 May) — The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is as eager – or even more – to see a peace agreement coming to stay; but it is cautious. From the statements of its negotiating panel chair and top officials, MILF will engage in the negotiation of substantive issues as agreed in the “Decision” without deviating from the political settlement Government has agreed to in August 1998, June 2001 and June 2010.
‘Rejoice’ and ‘Dare’
MILF Panel Chair Mohagher Iqbal did not publish his post-signing remarks – not in the MILF’s Luwaran; not in other local media like MindaNews (Iqbal’s closing statement was not written but spoken – Ed.) However, attached to the signed documents he sent MindaNews Editor Carolyn O. Arguillas, as well as this writer, he said his “closing remarks was very brief”, summarizing it in four points:
First: He congratulated the facilitator, ICG, GPH and MILF for working hard to give way to the signing of the document.
Second: He said, “Now I can say that we have achieved something to move us away from the stranglehold of the tight situation.”
Third: He cautioned with a dare: “However, while we rejoice with this achievement, I reminded everyone that the real hard works still lies ahead. It is where the devils lie in ambush. But I dare everyone to face the devils squarely. We will triumph especially if the Aquino administration makes the resolution of the Moro Question a ‘national commitment of his government’.
Fourth: Nevertheless, he was positive: “I am hopeful that with the cooperation and decisiveness of the parties, the GPH, MILF, ICG and the facilitating country or the facilitator, we would be able to sign the comprehensive compact sooner or later.”
Not Doomed
In his opening statement, Iqbal says the “peace negotiation is not doomed” despite that “the current peace negotiation is passing through a very difficult situation” noting that almost “two years into the Aquino administration, the two parties have barely moved from where they left off in 2010”. He pointed out the fact that “the most substantive part of this negotiation leading to the signing of the comprehensive compact is practically untouched”.
He presents three causes of the “very difficult situation” that has paralyzed the peace talks under the Aquino administration — two years since the signing of the June 3, 2010 Declaration of Continuity with the Arroyo government. In his Point 3 above, he says the “sooner or later” signing of a peace agreement largely depends on President Aquino III. Our naughty question: How soon is the “sooner” and how late is the “later”?
1st: Unitary System
How soon or late a peace agreement can be signed depends on the willingness of the Aquino III government to recognize the unacceptable status quo, its inequities on the Moros and the remedies. This puzzles since this in “Key Point 2” of the “Decision”. Government says it does recognize and has agreed to change it.
Iqbal explains the Bangsamoro perception: “From President Manuel Quezon in 1935 until President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the Philippine policy and thinking about the Moros have not basically changed. It is all about incorporating them into the national body politic, treating them as an integral part thereof, and sending the full force of the armed forces when they become restive or unruly.”
The Moros are still waiting for signs of change. “We have yet to see that under the Aquino administration things will start to shape differently and for the better. We still want to see that under his matuwid na daan (straight path) policy, he would agree to do away with the paralyzing effects of [that] status quo or the unitary system” – pointing out the unacceptable – “where subnational units are created and abolished and their powers may be broadened and narrowed, by the central government.” [Emphasis supplied]
The unacceptable status quo is the unitary system. The “much desired” solution: “a shift to the asymmetrical arrangement inherent in a federal system … wherein a group of members are bound together by covenant, with a governing representative head, which provides further that sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing authority and constituent political units (like states or provinces)”.
Where is the “very difficult situation”? The Aquino government and MILF widely differ in their perception of what “unacceptable status quo” is and in how to resolve this issue.
2nd: Different Approaches
Government and MILF differ in their negotiation approaches, Iqbal pointed out. “For the MILF peace panel, we want to see a process where we agree first on basic principles, concepts, frameworks, and parameters, then the elements, and then the parts or details. Obviously unknown to some, much has been achieved already in this regard.” This relates to “Key Point 3” of the “Decision”.
Iqbal continues to assert that the “basic principles and frameworks and the essential elements of the future Moro entity have been settled and agreed by the parties in many past documents” – enumerating those documents from the General Framework of Intent Between the GRP and the MILF of August 27, 1998 to the Declaration of Continuity for Peace Negotiation between the GPH and the MILF of June 3, 2010.
Why the Parties must negotiate from past agreements: To (1) “understand the current situation and move to the future with greater confidence and speed”; (2) “conduct the negotiation as faithfully as possible”; and (3) achieve “the much desired mutual trust and confidence between the parties [so] vital in moving forward”.
Iqbal relates circumstances MILF considers relevant to this rationale for continuity:
First: The Malaysian facilitator Datuk Othman Bin Abdulrazak, during the 2005 talk impasse, “frankly told not just the MILF peace panel but its Central Committee … that he cannot continue facilitating the talks with a secessionist agenda of the MILF … Either the MILF mellows down its stance to autonomy with no option to secede or the Malaysian government ceases its facilitation”. MILF yielded after a “series of consultations” that “culminated on May 29-31, 2005 … in Darapanan” which was graced by top officials of the OPAPP and the GRP peace panel. [Emphasis supplied]
Second: The talks during the time of Secretaries Silvestre Afable and Rodolfo Garcia, a retired army general, steadily led to the initialing of the MOA-AD due to the “healthy interpersonal relationships between the [GRP and MILF] peace panels”.
Third: The Supreme Court declared the MOA-AD unconstitutional but “rendered [it not just] little but big justice … by noting ‘that it can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions’.”
He considers it significant that by this decision the Court “conferred upon the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, considered the mother of all agreements between the government and MILF, that validity and binding effect on the government”.
This makes the Tripoli Agreement of 2001 more significant since it “served as the main guiding post for all subsequent agreements most especially that hoped-for ‘new formula’ contained in the proposed comprehensive compact. This is the reason why the MILF peace panel starts and situates its core position in this negotiation on this framework agreement.” Obviously, “new formula” refers to the MOA-AD. [Emphasis supplied]
Fourth: Reiterating that “the MILF stance is firmly anchored on the principle of right to self-determination of people” under a litany of international laws and agreements, Iqbal cites the “new formula”: “The negotiation and peaceful resolution of the conflict must involve consultations with the Bangsamoro people free of any imposition in order to provide chances of success and open new formulas that permanently respond to the aspirations of the Bangsamoro people for freedom.”
The Final Message: After his recital, Iqbal restates: “The ultimate goal of the talks is to consider new modalities to end the armed hostilities with responsibility, to protect … human security, [and] to resolve the legitimate grievances and claims for the people of Moro ancestry and origin.”
Recalling the August 27, 1998 General Framework of Agreement of Intent, he avows that MILF is “consistent and faithful” to the GRP-MILF “intention and commitment”, as stated in Article I of that agreement, to “pursue the peace negotiations on the substantive issues as soon as possible, resolutely continue the negotiation until the parties reach a negotiated political settlement”.
Apologetically, but to emphasize the difference between the GPH and MILF approaches, he lets go his restraint to say bluntly that “even the 3-for-1 proposal put forward by the government is in the category of an old formula that should not have been put forward if only to fast track the ongoing negotiation, as agreed by President Aquino and Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim in Tokyo, Japan on August 4, 2011”. [Emphasis supplied]
To cap the MILF position, Iqbal said it “very frankly”: First, “the MILF cannot slide down anymore lower than our current proposal for the establishment of a substate for our people.” Second, “the totality of relationship between the Philippine state and Moros, which is so one-sided against the latter, must be altered, if we are to see real peace and development in Mindanao.” Third, “the MILF cannot and will never accept a ‘recooked ARMM even with all the spices and ingredients to make it palatable to the MILF’.”
The MILE appeal to Government is its resolve: “Please do not offer the ARMM or any similar entity to the MILF again, because we will reject it with the same intensity, as we have done before, in 2000, in 2001, in 2003, and in 2010. It is only a waste of time, energy –- and goodwill.”
3rd: No Meeting of Minds
Iqbal explains in concrete the third cause of the difficult situation which is “there is no joinder of issues. The parties are speaking on dissimilar or irregular wavelengths and measures. The MILF proposes a comprehensive compact, which is what that declaration of continuity document obliges the parties to undertake, while the government puts forward a three-part proposal”. In other words, there are two propositions on the table; resolving one will not satisfy the other. There is no meeting of minds. [Emphasis supplied]
To negotiate the ancestral domain aspect of 2001 Tripoli Agreement, the GRP and MILF panels agreed first on the basic principles then on the strands of ancestral domain to have a common template or pattern. They separately formulated their proposals based on the template, then arranged these in a matrix – Column 1 for MILF proposal, 2 for GRP. The proposals and counterproposals were deliberated point by point – writing the text of the agreed points in Column 3. Where they had disagreements, they continued deliberating.
Iqbal observes: “This meticulous procedure was pursued patiently and objectively until they initialed the MOA-AD on July 27, 2008. … it was not easy … in truth, they … negotiated … for three years and eight months. But the collaborative efforts of the parties, notwithstanding the impasses, non-appearances, and walkouts, cemented their mutual respect with each other that [GRP Panel Chairs Silvestre] Afable or [Rodolfo] Garcia can call on their counterparts from the MILF even at short notice.”
He affirms that “nothing is personal in negotiation”; that “personal cultivation of trust and confidence amongst negotiators … in no small way helps bolster the productiveness of the parties”. While professing his trust in President Aquino III and “high respect for our current counterparts in the government”, Iqbal is unmistakably saying there is a need for more “joinder of issues” or meeting of minds between the Government and MILF negotiators.
Iqbal’s opening and closing statements at the 27th exploratory talks last month reflect his thinking. Being the chief negotiator, his thinking is the beacon his panel members look up to. Does his thinking mirror the thinking of the MILF chairman and other top MILF officials?. (“Comment” is Mr. Patricio P. Diaz’ column for MindaViews, the opinion section of MindaNews. The Titus Brandsma Media Awards honored Mr. Diaz with a “Lifetime Achievement Award” for his “commitment to education and public information to Mindanawons as Journalist, Educator and Peace Advocate.” You can reach him at patpdiazgsc@yahoo.com.)
(Next: NAPE or BSMG)